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Town of Greece v. Galloway 
12-696 
Ruling Below: Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 
WL 2149803. 
Residents of Town of Greece, New York Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens brought civil 
rights action suit against the town and Town Supervisor John Auberger in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of New York.  The town opened every town board 
meeting with a prayer; specifically, almost exclusively Christian prayers.  Residents asserted that 
aspects of the town prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause.  The district court granted 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed. 
Questions Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a legislative prayer 
practice violates the Establishment Clause notwithstanding the absence of discrimination in the 
selection of prayer-givers or forbidden exploitation of the prayer opportunity. 
 
 
Susan GALLOWAY and Linda Stephens, Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
TOWN OF GREECE, Defendant–Appellee 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
Decided on May 17, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
CALABRESI, Circuit Judge 
Since 1999, the Town of Greece, New York, 
has begun its Town Board meetings with a 
short prayer. In 2008, town residents Susan 
Galloway and Linda Stephens brought suit 
against the town and Town Supervisor John 
Auberger in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of New York, 
asserting that aspects of this prayer practice 
violated the Establishment Clause. The 
district court granted the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs 
appeal. We hold that, on this record, the 
district court erred in rejecting the plaintiffs' 
argument that the prayer practice 
impermissibly affiliated the town with a 
single creed, Christianity. Accordingly, we 
REVERSE and REMAND for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
For the most part, the facts at issue are not 
disputed, [although] the parties dispute how 
to characterize the facts… 
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The Town of Greece is a municipal 
corporation located in Monroe County, New 
York, just outside the city of Rochester. As 
of the 2000 census, the town had roughly 
94,000 residents. An elected, five-member 
Town Board governs the town and conducts 
official business at monthly public meetings. 
At these meetings, the Board votes on 
proposed ordinances, conducts public 
hearings, bestows citizenship awards, swears 
in new town employees, and the like. 
Residents and town employees attend Town 
Board meetings to monitor and participate in 
these aspects of town  governance. At times, 
children are among the residents attending 
town meetings; members of Boy Scout 
troops and other student groups have led the 
Pledge of Allegiance, and high school 
students may fulfill a state-mandated civics 
requirement necessary for graduation by 
going to Board meetings. 
Before 1999, Town Board meetings began 
with a moment of silence. That year, at 
Auberger's direction, the town began 
inviting local clergy to offer an opening 
prayer. Typically, Auberger has called each 
meeting to order, the Town Clerk has called 
the roll of Board members, and Auberger 
has then asked the audience to rise for the 
Pledge of Allegiance. After the audience has 
been seated following the Pledge, Auberger 
has introduced the month's prayer-giver, 
who has delivered the prayer over the 
Board's public address system. Prayer-givers 
have often asked members of the audience 
to participate by bowing their heads, 
standing, or joining in the prayer. After the 
prayer's conclusion, Auberger has typically 
thanked prayer-givers for being the town's 
“chaplain of the month,” at times also 
presenting them with a plaque. The town has 
consistently listed the prayer in each 
meeting's official minutes. 
Between 1999 and June 2010, when the 
record in this litigation closed, the town did 
not adopt any formal policy regarding (a) 
the process for inviting prayer-givers, (b) the 
permissible content of prayers, or (c) any 
other aspect of its prayer practice. The town 
claims that anyone may request to give an 
invocation, including adherents of any 
religion, atheists, and the nonreligious, and 
that it has never rejected such a request. The 
town also asserts that it does not review the 
language of prayers before they are 
delivered, and that it would not censor an 
invocation, no matter how unusual or 
offensive its content. When Galloway and 
Stephens complained about the town's 
prayer practice in 2007, the town explained 
the above-mentioned practices. The town 
acknowledges, however, that it has not 
publicized to town residents that anyone 
may volunteer to deliver prayers or that any 
type of invocation would be permissible. 
In practice, Christian clergy members have 
delivered nearly all of the prayers relevant to 
this litigation, and have done so at the town's 
invitation…. In 2008, after Galloway and 
Stephens had begun complaining to the town 
about its prayer practice, non-Christians 
delivered the prayer at four of the twelve 
Town Board meetings. A Wiccan priestess 
and the chairman of the local Baha'i 
congregation each delivered one of these 
prayers, and a lay Jewish man delivered the 
remaining two. The town invited the Wiccan 
priestess and the lay Jewish man after they 
inquired about delivering prayers; it appears 
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that the town invited the Baha'i chairman 
without receiving such an inquiry. However, 
between January 2009 and June 2010, when 
the record closed, all the prayer-givers were 
once again invited Christian clergy. 
Although the town did not adopt, prior to 
June 2010, a formal policy concerning the 
selection of prayer-givers, it developed a 
more or less standard procedure. Three 
successive employees at the town's Office of 
Constituent Services had responsibility for 
inviting clergy to deliver prayers. The 
employee first charged with this task 
initially solicited clergy by telephoning, at 
various times, all the religious organizations 
listed in the town's Community Guide, a 
publication of the Greece Chamber of 
Commerce. Thereafter, this employee, Linda 
Sofia, compiled a “Town Board Chaplain” 
list containing the names of individuals who 
had accepted invitations to give prayers. 
Sofia and the two employees who succeeded 
her in this role testified that they worked 
their way down the list, calling clergy about 
a week before each Town Board meeting 
until they found someone willing to give the 
prayer. They also testified that they updated 
the list periodically based on requests from 
community members and on new listings in 
the Community Guide and a local 
newspaper, the Greece Post. 
Until 2008, the “Town Board Chaplain” list 
contained only Christian organizations and 
clergy. Religious congregations in the town 
are primarily Christian. Galloway and 
Stephens have both lived in or near Greece 
for more than thirty years, and both testified 
that they were unaware of any non-Christian 
places of worship in the town. In the district 
court, the plaintiffs introduced a map 
indicating the presence of a Buddhist temple 
in the town as well as several Jewish 
synagogues located just outside the town. 
There is no indication, however, that these 
organizations were listed in the Community 
Guide or the Greece Post…. 
 In all, there were roughly 130 different 
invocations between 1999 and June 2010, of 
which more than 120 are contained within 
the record. The invocations in the record 
typically gave thanks for aspects of the life 
of the town and requested assistance with 
the ongoing project of town governance. 
After being introduced, prayer-givers tended 
to begin with some variant of “let us pray,” 
and then to speak about the matters for 
which “we” pray, ostensibly on behalf of the 
audience or the town more broadly. 
Members of the audience and the Board 
have bowed their heads, stood, and 
participated in the prayers by saying 
“Amen.” On a few occasions, some 
members of the Town Board have made the 
sign of the cross. 
A substantial majority of the prayers in the 
record contained uniquely Christian 
language. Roughly two-thirds contained 
references to “Jesus Christ,” “Jesus,” “Your 
Son,” or the “Holy Spirit.” Within this 
subset, almost all concluded with a 
statement that the prayer had been given in 
Jesus Christ's name. Typically, prayer-givers 
stated something like, “In Jesus's name we 
pray,” or “We ask this in Christ's name.” 
Some prayer-givers elaborated further, 
describing Christ as “our Savior,” “God's 
only son,” “the Lord,” or part of the Holy 
Trinity…. 
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The remaining third of the prayers spoke in 
more generically theistic terms. Christian 
clergy delivered prayers referring to “God of 
all creation,” “Heavenly Father,” and God's 
“kingdom of Heaven.” The lay Jewish 
prayer-giver spoke of “God,” the “Father,” 
and the “Lord”; he also referenced, at one 
point, “the songs of David, your servant.” 
The Baha'i prayer-giver referred generally to 
“God,” concluding his prayer with the 
Baha'i greeting, “Alláh–u–Abhá,” which 
loosely means “God the All Glorious.” 
Finally, the Wiccan priestess invoked 
Athena and Apollo; she stated these were 
fitting deities given the Town's name. 
Galloway and Stephens attended numerous 
Town Board meetings after the town 
initiated its prayer practice in 1999. In 
September 2007, they began complaining to 
town officials about the prayer practice, 
sometimes during public comment periods 
at Board meetings. In these informal 
complaints, the plaintiffs raised two types of 
objections, though they did not distinguish 
them as such. First, they asserted that the 
prayers aligned the town with Christianity. 
Second, they argued that the prayers were 
sectarian rather than secular. Town officials 
met with the plaintiffs and expressed the 
town's position that it would accept any 
volunteer to deliver the prayers and that it 
would not police the content of prayers. The 
town did not make any public response to 
the plaintiffs' complaints, however. Nor did 
it make any comment concerning the prayer 
delivered at an October 2007 meeting, 
which described objectors to the town's 
prayer practice as a “minority ... ignorant of 
the history of our country.” 
In February 2008, the plaintiffs filed suit 
against the town and Auberger, challenging 
aspects of the prayer practice under the 
Establishment Clause. They made two 
arguments before the district court: (1) that 
the town's procedure for selecting prayer-
givers unconstitutionally preferred 
Christianity over other faiths, and (2) that 
the prayer practice was impermissibly 
“sectarian.” In support of their position, the 
plaintiffs reiterated the same objections they 
had raised before the Town Board prior to 
filing suit. They claimed, as an initial matter, 
that the prayer practice aligned the town 
with Christianity, and that it therefore 
established a particular religion. They also 
pointed out that the prayer practice 
employed language unique to specific 
religious sects, and asserted that in so doing 
it established religion generally. The 
plaintiffs again did not distinguish between 
these arguments, nor have they done so on 
appeal. 
The district court, on cross-motions for 
summary judgment, entered judgment for 
the defendants. At the outset, the district 
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against 
Auberger as redundant of their claims 
against the town.  After holding that the 
plaintiffs had Article III standing to sue the 
town, the district court turned to the merits 
of their two arguments.  As to the plaintiffs' 
challenge regarding the town's prayer 
selection process, the district court held that 
the plaintiffs had failed to advance any 
credible evidence that town employees 
intentionally excluded representatives of 
particular faiths.  As to the plaintiffs' 
contention regarding the sectarian content of 
the prayers, the district court held that, under 
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binding Supreme Court case law, the 
Establishment Clause does not foreclose 
denominational prayers. The court 
concluded for these, and for a number of 
case-specific reasons, that the plaintiffs had 
failed to show that the town's prayer practice 
had the effect of establishing the Christian 
religion.   
II. DISCUSSION 
This appeal presents a narrow subset of the 
questions raised before the district court. 
Galloway and Stephens do not assert that the 
district court erred in dismissing their claims 
against Auberger. They have, moreover, 
expressly abandoned the argument that the 
town intentionally discriminated against 
non-Christians in its selection of prayer-
givers. Accordingly, the only live issue on 
appeal is whether the district court erred in 
rejecting the plaintiffs' assertion that the 
town's prayer practice had the effect, even if 
not the purpose, of establishing religion. 
We review a grant of summary judgment de 
novo…. 
A. 
As far as we are aware, this is the first 
instance in which this court has had 
occasion to consider the validity of a 
legislative prayer practice under the 
Establishment Clause. Our analysis must 
begin with Marsh v. Chambers, the only 
Supreme Court decision cited to us that has 
ruled on the constitutionality of legislative 
prayer. Marsh held that the Nebraska 
legislature's practice of opening its sessions 
with a prayer, delivered by a state-employed 
clergyman, did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. In so holding, Marsh did not employ 
the three-pronged test the Court had 
adopted, eleven years earlier, in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, for Establishment Clause 
cases.  Rather, the Marsh Court conducted a 
largely historical analysis, looking to the 
“unique history” of legislative prayer in 
America before turning to the particulars of 
the Nebraska Legislature's chaplaincy 
program.  
The Court first held that state-funded 
legislative prayer does not necessarily run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause…. 
Turning to Nebraska's practice, the Court 
dismissed three concerns raised by the state 
legislator who was plaintiff in the case. 
First, it rejected the argument that the 
sixteen-year tenure of the legislative 
chaplain, Robert E. Palmer, had “the effect 
of giving preference to his religious 
views.”  The evidence, the Court noted, 
suggested that Palmer was reappointed 
because of his performance and indicated 
that guest chaplains and substitutes had 
officiated at various times.  The Court held 
that “[a]bsent proof that the chaplain's 
reappointment stemmed from an 
impermissible motive,” Palmer's long tenure 
did not “in itself” violate the Establishment 
Clause.   
Second, the Court rejected the claim that 
Palmer's compensation from public funds 
conflicted with the Establishment Clause…. 
Third, the Court rejected the argument that 
the “Judeo–Christian” content of the prayers 
established religion. In describing the facts 
underlying this portion of the plaintiff's 
complaint, the Court reported that Palmer 
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had characterized his prayers as “ 
‘nonsectarian,’ ‘Judeo Christian,’ and with 
‘elements of the American civil religion.’ 
”  It also pointed out that “[a]lthough some 
of his earlier prayers were often explicitly 
Christian, Palmer removed all references to 
Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish 
legislator.” In responding to plaintiff's 
argument, the Court reasoned that “[t]he 
content of the prayer is not of concern to 
judges where, as here, there is no indication 
that the prayer opportunity has been 
exploited to proselytize or advance any one, 
or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”  For these reasons, the Court 
concluded, it was not necessary for it “to 
embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse 
the content of a particular prayer.”   
Six years later, however, in a case that did 
not involve a challenge to legislative prayer, 
the Supreme Court suggested that legislative 
prayers invoking particular sectarian beliefs 
may, on the basis of those references alone, 
violate the Establishment Clause. The 
decision, County of Allegheny v. American 
Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, rejected the argument 
that Marsh's historical analysis validated a 
city's holiday crèche display. The Court 
wrote: “However history may affect the 
constitutionality of nonsectarian references 
to religion by the government, history 
cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate 
the government's allegiance to a particular 
sect or creed.”  Marsh, it reasoned, 
recognized that history could not justify 
current practices “that have the effect of 
affiliating the government with any one 
specific faith or belief.”… 
As read by Allegheny, Marsh has remained a 
fixed point within the High Court's 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Three 
years later, in striking down a public school 
district's practice of including prayer in its 
graduation ceremonies, the Court 
distinguished Marsh in light of “[i]nherent 
differences between the public school 
system and a session of a state legislature.” 
In doing so, it pointed specifically to the 
difference between “[t]he influence and 
force of a formal exercise in a school 
graduation” as against a legislative session. 
More recently, in noting that “Establishment 
Clause doctrine lacks the comfort of 
categorical absolutes,” the Court 
invoked Marsh as an instance in which it 
had “found good reason to hold 
governmental action legitimate even where 
its manifest purpose was presumably 
religious.” 
B. 
Various circuit court decisions, drawing on 
the Court's language in Allegheny, have 
questioned the validity of all forms of 
“sectarian” prayers. In the most recent of 
these, Judge Wilkinson wrote for the Fourth 
Circuit that Marsh and Allegheny, read 
together, seek both to acknowledge that 
legislative prayer can “solemnize the 
weighty task of governance” and to 
minimize the risks of “sectarian strife” such 
prayer may generate by requiring that 
invocations “embrace a non-sectarian 
ideal.”  
To the extent that these circuit cases stand 
for the proposition that a given legislative 
prayer practice, viewed in its entirety, may 
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not advance a single religious sect, we 
cannot disagree. Under Marsh, legislative 
prayers may not be “exploited to proselytize 
or advance any one, or to disparage any 
other, faith or belief.” It is also clear, 
under Allegheny, that legislative prayers 
may not “have the effect of affiliating the 
government with any one specific faith or 
belief.”  Joyner, Hinrichs, and Stein might 
be read simply to reiterate these standards, 
rather than to construe Marsh 
and Allegheny as precluding denominational 
content in any individual prayer. Construed 
in this fashion, the distinction between 
sectarian and nonsectarian prayers merely 
serves as a shorthand, albeit a potentially 
confusing one, for the prohibition on 
religious advancement or affiliation outlined 
in Marsh and Allegheny. 
To the extent that these circuit cases stand 
instead for the proposition that the 
Establishment Clause precludes all 
legislative invocations that are 
denominational in nature, however, we 
cannot agree. The line between sectarian and 
nonsectarian prayers, though perhaps the 
least defective among various possible 
distinctions that can be drawn in this area, 
runs into two sizable doctrinal problems. 
First, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected the notion that the 
government “may establish an official or 
civic religion as a means of avoiding the 
establishment of a religion with more 
specific creeds.” Admittedly, Lee,which 
postdated both Marsh and Allegheny, did not 
involve legislative prayer. But its language 
was seemingly unequivocal. The Lee Court 
held that the defendant public school district 
had violated the Establishment Clause when 
it advised a rabbi that his prayers at the 
school's graduation ceremony “should be 
nonsectarian.”  A state-imposed requirement 
that all legislative prayers be 
nondenominational, the Court reasoned, 
begins to sound like the establishment of “an 
official or civic religion.” Indeed, Lee made 
express its disagreement with the Sixth 
Circuit's contrary language in Stein. The 
problem with such civic religious statements 
lies, in part, in the danger that such efforts to 
secure religious “neutrality” may produce “a 
brooding and pervasive devotion to the 
secular and a passive, or even active, 
hostility to the religious.” Under the First 
Amendment, the government may not 
establish a vague theism as a state religion 
any more than it may establish a specific 
creed. 
The second difficulty with the simple 
sectarian/nonsectarian approach seemingly 
adopted by some circuits is that the 
touchstone of our analysis must 
be Marsh, which is hard to read, even in 
light of Allegheny, as saying that 
denominational prayers, in and of 
themselves, violate the Establishment 
Clause. It is true that Allegheny pointed out 
that the prayers in Marsh did not have “the 
effect of affiliating the government with any 
one specific faith or belief .... because the 
particular chaplain had ‘removed all 
references to Christ.’ ”  But this does not 
mean that any single denominational prayer 
has the forbidden effect of affiliating the 
government with any one faith. A series of 
denominational prayers, each delivered in 
the name of a different sect, could hardly be 
perceived as having this effect.  At any rate, 
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the chaplain's categorization of the prayers 
in Marsh as “nonsectarian” was plainly 
contestable with respect to prayers delivered 
prior to the 1980 complaint…. 
Accordingly, our inquiry cannot look solely 
to whether the town's legislative prayer 
practice contained sectarian references. We 
must ask, instead, whether the town's 
practice, viewed in its totality by an 
ordinary, reasonable observer, conveyed the 
view that the town favored or disfavored 
certain religious beliefs. In other words, we 
must ask whether the town, through its 
prayer practice, has established particular 
religious beliefs as the more acceptable 
ones, and others as less acceptable. This 
inquiry, for its part, must be made in the 
light of the particular prayer practice upheld 
in Marsh and addressed in Allegheny. As a 
result, it is clear, for example, that the 
longstanding appointment of a single 
Christian clergyman does not, in 
itself, convey the prohibited favoritism, and 
the same is apparently true of “Judeo–
Christian” prayers that make no reference to 
Christ. Beyond that, however, any number 
of different legislative prayer practices could 
be read to yield any number of messages—
acceptable or forbidden—about religion. 
C. 
Within these confines, we see “no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal 
judgment.”  In Marsh, as we have noted, the 
Supreme Court did not employ 
the Lemon test; nor did it adopt any other 
precise criteria to govern cases involving 
legislative prayer. Instead, the decision 
addressed a series of case-specific concerns 
raised by the plaintiff. In fact-intensive cases 
like this one, which defy exact legal 
formulas, the exercise of “legal judgment” is 
not the same as the exercise of “personal 
judgment”; it must “reflect and remain 
faithful to the underlying purposes” of the 
relevant constitutional provisions, and it 
must “take account of context and 
consequences measured in light of those 
purposes.”…  
We conclude, on the record before us, that 
the town's prayer practice must be viewed as 
an endorsement of a particular religious 
viewpoint. This conclusion is supported by 
several considerations, including the prayer-
giver selection process, the content of the 
prayers, and the contextual actions (and 
inactions) of prayer-givers and town 
officials. We emphasize that, in reaching 
this conclusion, we do not rely on any single 
aspect of the town's prayer practice, but 
rather on the totality of the circumstances 
present in this case…. 
In our view, whether a town's prayer-
selection process constitutes an 
establishment of religion depends on the 
extent to which the selection process results 
in a perspective that is substantially neutral 
amongst creeds. The town asserts, and there 
is no evidence to the contrary, that it would 
have accepted any and all volunteers who 
asked to give the prayer. But the town 
neither publicly solicited volunteers to 
deliver invocations nor informed members 
of the general public that volunteers would 
be considered or accepted, let alone 
welcomed, regardless of their religious 
beliefs or non-beliefs. Had the town publicly 
opened its prayer practice to volunteers in 
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this way, its selection process could be 
defended more readily as random in the 
relevant sense…. 
It is no small thing for a non-Christian (or 
for a Christian, for that matter) to pray “in 
the name of Jesus Christ.” Prayers delivered 
in this fashion invoke “a deity in whose 
divinity only those of the Christian faith 
believe,” and do so to the clear exclusion of 
other faiths. References to Christ as “Our 
Savior” and invocations of the Holy Trinity 
do the same thing. 
The sectarian nature of the prayers, we 
emphasize, was not inherently a problem. 
The prayers in the record were not offensive 
in the way identified as problematic 
in Marsh: they did not preach conversion, 
threaten damnation to nonbelievers, 
downgrade other faiths, or the like. Prayers 
of this more offensive sort might be 
sufficient in themselves to give rise to an 
Establishment Clause violation. But we need 
not determine whether any single prayer at 
issue here suffices to give such an indication 
of establishment, since we find that on the 
totality of the circumstances presented the 
town's prayer practice identified the town 
with Christianity in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
The town had an obligation to consider how 
its prayer practice would be perceived by 
those who attended Town Board meetings. 
And, despite the homogeneity of viewpoints 
reflected by the invocations, the town did 
not explain that it intended the prayers to 
solemnize Board meetings, rather than to 
affiliate the town with any particular creed. 
The town never informed prayer-givers that 
invocations were not to be “exploited as an 
effort to convert others to the particular faith 
of the invocational speaker, nor to disparage 
any faith or belief different than that of the 
invocational speaker.”  Absent any effort on 
the part of the town to explain the nature of 
its prayer program to attendees, the rare 
handful of cases, over the course of a 
decade, in which individuals from other 
faiths delivered the invocation cannot 
overcome the impression, created by the 
steady drumbeat of often specifically 
sectarian Christian prayers, that the town's 
prayer practice associated the town with the 
Christian religion. 
We ascribe no religious animus to the town 
or its leaders. The town's desire to mark the 
solemnity of its proceedings with a prayer is 
understandable; Americans have done just 
that for more than two hundred years. But 
when one creed dominates others—
regardless of a town's intentions—
constitutional concerns come to the fore….  
Finally, it is relevant, and worthy of weight, 
that most prayer-givers appeared to speak on 
behalf of the town and its residents, rather 
than only on behalf of themselves. Prayer-
givers often requested that the audience 
participate, and spoke in the first-person 
plural: let “us” pray, “our” savior, “we” ask, 
and so on. Town officials, whether 
intentionally or not, contributed to the 
impression that these prayer-givers spoke on 
the town's behalf. After many of the prayer-
givers finished their invocations, Auberger 
thanked them for being “our chaplain of the 
month.” There was testimony, as well, that 
members of the Town Board participated in 
the prayers by bowing their heads, saying 
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“Amen,” or making the sign of the Cross. 
The invitation to audience members to 
participate in the prayer, particularly by 
physical means such as standing or bowing 
their heads, placed audience members who 
are nonreligious or adherents of non-
Christian religion in the awkward position of 
either participating in prayers invoking 
beliefs they did not share or appearing to 
show disrespect for the invocation, 
thus further projecting the message that the 
town endorsed, and expected its residents to 
endorse, a particular creed.  
On the record before us, taking into account 
all of these contextual considerations in 
concert, we reverse the grant of summary 
judgment. We conclude that an objective, 
reasonable person would believe that the 
town's prayer practice had the effect of 
affiliating the town with Christianity. In 
reaching this conclusion, we underscore that 
we do not rely on any single aspect of the 
town's prayer practice, but rather the 
interaction of the facts present in this case. 
The extent to which a given act conveys the 
message of affiliation, or fails to do so, will 
depend on the various circumstances that 
circumscribe it. Accordingly, we do not aim 
to specify what the Establishment Clause 
allows, but restrict ourselves to noting the 
ways in which this town must be read to 
have conveyed a religious affiliation…. 
D. 
We emphasize what we do not hold. We do 
not hold that the town may not open its 
public meetings with a prayer or invocation. 
Such legislative prayers, as Marsh holds and 
as we have repeatedly noted, do not violate 
the Establishment Clause. Nor do we hold 
that any prayers offered in this context must 
be blandly “nonsectarian.” A requirement 
that town officials censor the invocations 
offered—beyond the limited requirement, 
recognized in Marsh, that prayer-givers be 
advised that they may not proselytize for, or 
disparage, particular religions—is not only 
not required by the Constitution, but risks 
establishing a “civic religion” of its own. 
Occasional prayers recognizing the 
divinities or beliefs of a particular creed, in a 
context that makes clear that the town is not 
endorsing or affiliating itself with that creed 
or, more broadly, with religion or non-
religion, are not offensive to the 
Constitution. Nor are we adopting a test that 
permits prayers in theory but makes it 
impossible for a town in practice to avoid 
Establishment Clause problems. To the 
contrary, it seems to us that a practice such 
as the one to which the town here apparently 
aspired—one that is inclusive of multiple 
beliefs and makes clear, in public word and 
gesture, that the prayers offered are 
presented by a randomly chosen group of 
volunteers, who do not express an official 
town religion, and do not purport to speak 
on behalf of all the town's residents or to 
compel their assent to a particular belief—is 
fully compatible with the First Amendment. 
What we do hold is that a legislative prayer 
practice that, however well-intentioned, 
conveys to a reasonable objective observer 
under the totality of the circumstances an 
official affiliation with a particular religion 
violates the clear command of the 
Establishment Clause. Where the 
overwhelming predominance of prayers 
offered are associated, often in an explicitly 
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sectarian way, with a particular creed, and 
where the town takes no steps to avoid the 
identification, but rather conveys the 
impression that town officials themselves 
identify with the sectarian prayers and that 
residents in attendance are expected to 
participate in them, a reasonable objective 
observer would perceive such an 
affiliation…. 
Ours is a society splintered, and joined, by a 
wide a constellation of religious beliefs and 
non-beliefs. Amidst these many viewpoints, 
even a single circumstance may appear to 
suggest an affiliation. To the extent that the 
state cannot make demands regarding the 
content of legislative prayers, moreover, 
municipalities have few means to forestall 
the prayer-giver who cannot resist the urge 
to proselytize. These difficulties may well 
prompt municipalities to pause and think 
carefully before adopting legislative prayer, 
but they are not grounds on which to 
preclude its practice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE 
the district court's grant of summary 
judgment and REMAND for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 
leave it to the district court, with the 




“Court to Rule on Government Prayer” 
SCOTUS Blog 
May 20, 2013 
Lyle Denniston 
 
Returning for the first time in three decades 
to the constitutionality of saying prayers at 
the opening of a government meeting, the 
Supreme Court on Monday took on a case 
involving Town Board sessions 
in the upstate New York community named 
Greece, a city of about 100,000 people.  For 
years, it followed the practice of having 
local clergy — mostly leaders of Christian 
congregations — recite prayers to start 
Town Board public meetings. 
The case of Town of Greece v. 
Galloway (docket 12-696) was one of five 
newly granted cases, all of which will be 
heard and decided in the Term starting next 
October.   No current member of the Court 
was serving when the Court last ruled on 
government prayers in the case of Marsh v. 
Chambers, in 1983. 
In the town of Greece, which is located in 
Monroe County just outside of Rochester, 
the opening prayer practice began in 1999 
and continued at least through 2010, when 
lower courts ruled on its validity.  As the 
case reached the Supreme Court in a plea by 
the town, the practice had been ruled 
unconstitutional by the Second Circuit 
Court. 
With two local residents challenging the 
prayer ritual, the Circuit Court concluded 
that — on the specific facts of this case 
alone — the recitation by clergy had the 
effect of aligning the town government 
officially with a particular faith — 
Christianity.   The Circuit Court stressed that 
it was not ruling that a local government 
could never open its meetings with prayers 
or a religious invocation, nor was it adopting 
a specific test that would allow prayer in 
theory but make it impossible in reality. 
What it did rule, the Circuit Court said, was 
that “a legislative prayer practice that, 
however well-intentioned, conveys to a 
reasonable objective observer under the 
totality of the circumstances an official 
affiliation with a particular religion, violates 
the clear command of the [First 
Amendment's] Establishment Clause.” 
It emphasized that, in the situation in 
Greece, New York, the overall impression of 
the practice was that it was dominated by 
Christian clergy and specific expressions of 
Christian beliefs, and that the town officials 
took no steps to try to dispel that impression. 
The Supreme Court’s agreement to review 
the decision might be interpreted as an 
indication that the Justices could be 
preparing to make a major pronouncement 
on religion in the public sphere, but it also 
might be understood as an intent to focus 
solely on the specific facts of the practice as 
it unfolded in this one community. 
As the case develops, though, it almost 
certainly will draw wide interest from 
advocacy organizations and religious 
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entities, if for no other reason than the Court 
has not examined the specific question in 
some thirty years.   Eighteen states had 
joined in urging the Court to grant review of 
the new case. 
In the 1983 decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 
the Supreme Court upheld an opening prayer 
tradition at the Nebraska state legislature.  It 
did so, however, by relying solely upon the 
tradition of legislative opening prayers that 
Congress had followed since the Founding 
era.  In asking the Supreme Court to return 
to the issue, the town of Greece argued that 
the lower courts have divided deeply over 
the constitutional standards to be applied to 
judge such prayer exercises. 
Since 1983, the Court has decided only two 
cases involving prayer as an issue in church-
state relations, and both of those cases found 
invalid prayers that appeared to be 
sponsored by public school officials — at 
graduation ceremonies in a 1992 decision, 
and at a school football game in 2000. 
While the Court granted the new case from 
the town of Greece after its 
second examination of the town’s petition, 
the Court took no action once again — after 
considering it a seventh time — on another 
case involving religion in the public 
sphere.   At issue in the case of Elmbrook 
School District v. Doe (12-755) is the 
constitutionality of holding a high school 
graduation ceremony in a church.   There 
has been no explanation of what the Court is 




“Council Prayers Get Top Court Review in Church-State Case” 
Bloomberg 
May 20, 2013 
Greg Stohr 
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider the 
constitutional limits on prayers during 
legislative sessions, accepting an appeal 
from a New York town that starts most 
council meetings with a Christian 
invocation. 
The justices today said they will review a 
federal appeals court’s conclusion that the 
Rochester suburb of Greece was improperly 
affiliating itself with Christianity. 
The Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that 
legislative bodies could open sessions with a 
prayer delivered by a state-employed 
religious leader. The latest case gives the 
court under Chief Justice John Roberts a 
chance to reinforce that ruling and insulate 
government bodies from legal challenges to 
what is now a widespread practice across the 
country. 
“The practice of legislative prayer is firmly 
embedded in the history and traditions of 
this nation,” Thomas Hungar, the lead 
lawyer representing the town, said in a 
statement. “We hope the court will reaffirm 
the settled understanding that such prayers, 
offered without improper motive and in 
accordance with the conscience of the 
prayer-giver, are constitutional.” 
The New York-based 2nd U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals said Greece’s selection process 
“virtually ensured a Christian viewpoint” at 
the vast majority of council meetings. Under 
the informal invitation procedures then in 
place, every prayer-giver from 1999 to 2007 
was a Christian clergy member, the three-
judge panel said. 
Wiccan Priestess 
After two town residents complained, non-
Christians delivered the invocation at four of 
the 12 board meetings in 2008. The group 
included a Wiccan priestess, the chairman of 
the local Baha’i congregation and a lay 
Jewish man who delivered two invocations. 
The appeals court also said town officials 
took no steps to mitigate the impression that 
the city endorsed Christianity. 
“The town had an obligation to consider 
how its prayer practice would be perceived 
by those who attended town board 
meetings,” Judge Guido Calabresi wrote for 
the panel. “And, despite the homogeneity of 
viewpoints reflected by the invocations, the 
town did not explain that it intended the 
prayers to solemnize board meetings, rather 
than to affiliate the town with any particular 
creed.” 
The appeals court pointed to a 1989 
Supreme Court ruling, County of Allegheny 
v. American Civil Liberties Union, which 
barred a Pennsylvania county from erecting 
a Nativity scene in a courthouse. 
‘Specific Faith’ 
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In that case, the majority said in passing that 
legislative prayers are impermissible if they 
“have the effect of affiliating the 
government with any one specific faith or 
belief.” 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the 
pivotal opinion in the 1989 case, saying the 
Nativity display was an impermissible 
governmental “endorsement” of religion. 
The two residents challenging Greece’s 
practices, Susan Galloway and Linda 
Stephens, asked the Supreme Court not to 
hear the appeal. Even under the 1983 
decision, Marsh v. Chambers, legislative 
bodies may not use prayers to “advance one 
faith to the exclusion of others,” the two 
women argued in court papers. 
“A town council meeting isn’t a church 
service, and it shouldn’t seem like one,” said 
Barry W. Lynn, executive director of 
Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, the Washington-based 
organization behind the lawsuit. 
“Government can’t serve everyone in the 
community when it endorses one faith over 
others.” 
Eighteen states, led by Indiana, and 49 
members of Congress joined Greece in 
urging the high court to get involved. 
The case, which the court will hear in the 
nine-month term that starts in October, is 




“The Supreme Court Takes the Case of Town of Greece v. Galloway, Which 
Raises the Question Whether – And If So, How – A Town Board May Open 
Its Meetings with Prayer” 
Justia 
May 30, 2013 
Marci A. Hamilton 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari last 
week in an important Establishment Clause 
case, Town of Greece v. Galloway, which 
poses the questions whether—and if so, 
how—a local government may open its 
public meetings with prayer.  The fact of the 
cert grant is interesting for doctrinal reasons, 
of course, but so is the question of why this 
Court would take such a case. 
The Case of Town of Greece v. Galloway 
This case is already squaring up to be a 
landmark battle in the ongoing culture war 
over control of government programs and 
spaces, and control of American culture 
generally. 
Until 1999, the Town of Greece opened its 
Town Board meetings with a moment of 
silence, a practice that is unquestionably 
constitutional.  In 1999, however, the 
practice changed, when the Town 
Supervisor, John Auberger, substituted 
prayer for silence.  According to Auberger’s 
Town profile, he is a member of St. 
Lawrence Roman Catholic Church and the 
Knights of Columbus, and virtually all of the 
monthly “chaplains” have been 
Christian.  The Town and Auberger have 
allied themselves with the most extreme 
proponents of government-sponsored prayer. 
They have the Alliance Defense Fund 
representing them, and an amicus brief has 
been filed on their behalf by the Foundation 
for Moral Law. (That foundation is led by 
Judge Roy Moore, who belligerently 
violated the Establishment Clause by 
bringing his own two-ton granite rendition 
of a version of the Ten Commandments into 
the lobby of the Alabama Supreme Court). 
Other amici include the Liberty Institute and 
the National Legal Foundation, which 
advertises itself as a “Christian public 
interest law firm”.  It is no secret that these 
groups are aggressively seeking to re-
introduce prayer in public schools, a 
movement that includes many who insist 
that this is a “Christian country.” 
The Town of Greece has moved backward, 
if you measure what they did in comparison 
to how the constitutional doctrine has 
developed.  Once the Supreme Court held 
that public schools could not sponsor prayer, 
the alternative substituted was a moment of 
silence.  The former was exclusionary, but 
the new practice sent no message to the 
participants that the government expected 
them to follow any particular creed.  With 
the constantly expanded galaxy of beliefs in 
the United States, this was a salutary 
development for liberty and peace. 
There is no indication why Supervisor 
Auberger decided to displace the likely 
constitutional moment of silence with 
constitutionally suspect 
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prayer.  Under Wallace v. Jaffree, a moment 
of silence might be constitutional, but not if 
it was packaged as a moment of “meditation 
and voluntary prayer.”  In light of his own 
bio on the Town website, he is a believer 
and a Christian.  We can never learn motive, 
but what is the purpose of displacing a 
moment of silence with prayer in 1999, if 
not to underscore a purpose of supporting, 
endorsing, and propagating religion?  The 
time line in this case does not bode well for 
Greece. 
The procedures are also suspect and fraught 
with the potential for the Town to impose 
religious content and viewpoint on its 
citizens.  The Town of Greece solicited 
clergy month-by-month, by calling those 
religious groups (all Christian) listed in a 
Chamber of Commerce publication.  Calls 
were made by a Town employee until a 
member of the clergy was found to open the 
next monthly session.  Sometimes, 
Supervisor Auberger gave the chaplain of 
the month a plaque or special 
commendation.  Again, these practices were 
arbitrary and unilateral. 
By and large, the prayers have been 
delivered solely by Christian clergy, except 
for a blip of time that—not coincidentally—
fell in the midst of the litigation where they 
recruited a Wiccan priestess, a Baha’i 
congregation leader, and a secular Jew.  By 
the close of the record, though, they were 
back to a purely Christian contingent of 
chaplains, who frequently invoked Jesus, 
God, and the Holy Spirit. 
This practice was challenged by Susan 
Galloway and Linda Stephens, who attended 
the public Town Board 
meetings.  Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State represents Galloway 
and Stephens.  Their claims sound in Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s endorsement test, 
for Galloway and Stephens argue that the 
Town appeared to have aligned itself with a 
single religious tradition, Christianity, and 
that the government’s endorsement of 
Christianity is a violation of the separation 
of church and state, as that principle has 
been interpreted in Establishment Clause 
doctrine.  Under existing doctrine, they are 
on solid ground. 
First Amendment Religion Doctrine 
Weighs Against the Town 
The facts are pretty stark here.  A religious 
town supervisor decided that a moment of 
silence was not enough, and instead 
embroiled the town in likely litigation by 
recruiting chaplains to start Town Board 
meetings with sectarian prayers.  Moreover, 
the vast majority of recruited chaplains over 
the years have shared the same faith as the 
supervisor.  And no citizen or resident could 
attend the Board Meetings without being 
subjected to the prayers. 
Under the First Amendment, it is incumbent 
upon the government not to endorse a single 
religion, and not to choose between religion 
and irreligion.  These are well-settled 
principles, and they have contributed to the 
remarkable achievement in the United States 
of simultaneous expanding diversity of 
religious belief and a lack of religious civil 
wars. 
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The one case that might potentially cut on 
the side of the Town is Marsh v. Chambers. 
There, the Court held that opening prayers in 
a state legislature were constitutional, 
largely because of the long history of 
opening legislative sessions with 
prayer.  The Court reasoned, as it had 
in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 
which upheld property tax exemptions for 
religious groups, that a practice that had 
been in place since the beginning of the 
country and had not resulted in an 
established church must not be a violation of 
the Constitution.  The Court did not, 
however, otherwise address its 
Establishment Clause doctrine, which must 
be applied in this case, where the prayers 
were not initiated until 1999.  In cases 
like Town of Greece, the Court will have to 
use its standard Establishment Clause 
doctrine, which is found in the factors listed 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman and later cases 
interpreting those factors. 
On the other side, there are many Supreme 
Court cases addressing government support 
or preference for religion that spell trouble 
for the Town.  In Allegheny County v. 
ACLU, the Court held that the county could 
not place a nativity, or crèche, scene on the 
Grand Staircase of the county courthouse, 
because it sent a message of endorsement of 
Christianity. 
The school cases are also 
instructive.  In Engel v. Vitale, the Court 
held that public schools could not deliver a 
prayer each day to the students. And 
in Stone v. Graham, public schools were not 
permitted to post the Ten Commandments in 
every classroom, where there was no secular 
purpose to do so. 
In Lee v. Weisman, in a decision authored by 
Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held 
that a public school could not include a 
prayer at graduation, because it endorsed a 
religious tradition, and left students in the 
audience feeling as though they were not 
full members of the community.  The same 
reasoning was embraced in Santa Fe 
Independent School Dist v. Doe, where the 
Court invalidated a Texas public school’s 
practice of having students present prayers 
over the public announcement system as part 
of the program immediately preceding 
football games. 
Both of the latter cases, Lee and Santa Fe, 
highlighted the plight of the student, or 
citizen, who is caught at a public event, but 
who does not subscribe to the religious 
views being propagated by the government 
at that event. The cases convey an easily 
understandable principle: it is unacceptable, 
under the Constitution, for the government 
to deliver a message on behalf of a religious 
viewpoint, in part because it marginalizes 
those who don’t share the same 
perspective.  Underlying that principle is 
that national citizenship entails inclusion, 
regardless of belief or creed.  To put it 
another way, religious entities have the 
right, under the First Amendment to create 
insiders and outsiders within their own faith, 
but the government may not do the 
same.  We are all Americans with the same 
government, regardless of our faith.  The 
drive for government-sponsored prayer is a 
drive for division, and, therefore, a danger. 
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Galloway and Stephens were receiving, loud 
and clear, a message from the Town 
Supervisor and the Board that if they wanted 
to exercise their rights as citizens to monitor 
and speak to their government, then they 
first had to sit through the Supervisor’s 
decision to impose a prayer at the start of the 
meeting. 
This Supreme Court and the 
Establishment Clause 
Under most constitutional metrics, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was 
correct in holding that the Town of Greece’s 
practice was likely 
unconstitutional.  Normally, the Supreme 
Court does not take cases that pose settled 
questions of law.  Therefore, the question 
that this certiorari grant raises is why this 
Court took it. 
I hope the answer is not because the 
conservative members of the Court intend to 
be judicial activists intent on rolling back 
the principle of government neutrality 
toward religion.  Most court watchers would 
assume that there may be four conservative 
members of the Court who are inclined to 
jettison the endorsement test, Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito, and who would embrace the agendas 
of the Alliance Defense Fund, and others 
who are backing the Town in this case.  I 
also hope that the fact they are all Catholic 
does not lead them, consciously or 
unconsciously, to be more sympathetic to 
the Town Supervisor in this case. 
While even they have necessarily abandoned 
the notion that this is a “Christian country,” 
they have embraced the idea it is a 
monotheistic country.  In other words, they 
have had to concede that there is meaningful 
diversity in America, going beyond the 
diversity among Christians, but they have 
held fast, so far, to the concept that all the 
“major” religions are united in worshiping a 
single deity. 
The problem for these four conservative 
Justices is that we are long past the moment 
in history when the Court could plausibly or 
legitimately state, let alone hold, that this is 
just a “monotheistic country.”  The diversity 
of religious belief in the United States is 
nearly boundless, with sects numbering in 
the tens of thousands, and new schisms and 
believers appearing daily.  It is rank denial 
to insist that the millions of Buddhists and 
Hindus in the country are “monotheists,” not 
to mention the growing numbers of Pagan 
believers, and just as important for these 
purposes, the growing number of spiritual 
believers who do not embrace organized 
religion.  We have established a spectrum 
and variety of religious experience that is 
unrivaled in history, and we have done it 
without raising arms against each other. 
“Monotheism” mischaracterizes the 
American religious experience, and in fact, 
falsifies it. 
Indeed, in an era of Islamic terrorism, which 
exists to impose its religious viewpoint on 
the world and is offended by the religious 
liberty and diversity of the world, it is hard 
to explain why anyone still thinks that 
government control or support of a 
particular religion makes sense.  We need 
individual and personal liberty, but what we 
also need to do is set an example for the 
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world of why the totalitarianism at the heart 
of Islamic radicalism is so wrong. 
Justice Kennedy, as usual now, likely will 
be a swing vote.  He authored Lee, and 
labeled the constitutional violation in that 
case “coercion,” but his opinion read very 
much like the Court’s endorsement test, 
making it highly unlikely that he will 
abandon the test in substance.  He took 
seriously in that case the reality that a 
captive audience attending a graduation 
ceremony could not be made to feel like 
non-citizens consistent with the First 
Amendment.  The same principle applies to 
the Town resident who wants to attend the 
Town Board meetings to monitor 
governance, but not to participate in 
religion.  There is no other venue in which 
to obtain the same information, and so they 
are trapped in a very real sense.  Giving up 
attending the public meetings of one’s local 
government is too much for the government 
to ask of those who don’t share the religious 
viewpoint of the government-sponsored 
speaker, or any religious viewpoint at all. 
I assume the four more liberal members of 
the Court, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, will be more likely 
to find that the endorsement test is 
appropriate and violated in these 
circumstances, and that the Establishment 
Clause is essential to liberty and 
safety.  Justice Kagan did raise eyebrows 
when she joined Justice Alito in Hosanna-
Tabor when he wrote in favor of 
“autonomy” for religious organizations, 
which is an extremist position at odds with 
the ordered liberty imposed by the First 
Amendment doctrine from the 
beginning.  But that decision and 
concurrence is so far removed from this 
case, that vote reveals little. 
What is at stake in Town of Greece is our 
self-image of ourselves as a 
collective.  Those in favor of permitting 
local governments to open their public 
meetings with predominantly Christian 
messages have myopia or a sort of body 
image disorder.  They simply are not seeing 
what is in front of them.  If the Justices 
accept the actual diversity of the United 
States and the need of government in these 
difficult times to eschew taking sides on 
faith, the holding in this case will be 
inevitable: the Town of Greece has violated 




 “2nd Circuit Finds NY Town Prayers Unconstitutional” 
Thomson Reuters News & Insight 
May 17, 2012 
Terry Baynes 
A federal appeals court on Thursday revived 
a challenge against the town of Greece in 
upstate New York over its policy of holding 
opening prayers at town board meetings. 
The New York-based U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 2nd Circuit found that the prayer 
policy aligned the town with Christianity in 
violation of the Establishment Clause, which 
prevents the government from favoring one 
religion over another. 
"The town’s desire to mark the solemnity of 
its proceedings with a prayer is 
understandable; Americans have done just 
that for more than two hundred years. But 
when one creed dominates others -- 
regardless of a town’s intentions -- 
constitutional concerns come to the fore," 
Judge Guido Calabresi wrote for a 
unanimous three-judge panel. 
Two Greece residents, Susan Galloway and 
Linda Stephens, complained in 2007 that the 
town board only invited Christian clergy to 
deliver the invocation. The next year, the 
town invited a Wiccan priestess, a chairman 
of a local Baha'i congregation and a lay 
Jewish man to give the prayer. But prayers 
at eight of the 12 meetings were Christian. 
Galloway and Stephens sued the town and 
its supervisor in 2008, challenging the 
prayer practice under the Establishment 
Clause. The district court ruled in the town’s 
favor before a trial, finding that town 
employees did not intentionally exclude any 
particular faiths and did not restrict the 
content of the prayers. 
But the 2nd Circuit panel reversed that 
decision on Thursday, finding that the 
town’s process for selecting speakers 
virtually ensured a Christian viewpoint. 
Even though most of the congregations in 
Greece were Christian, the town could have 
invited clergy from outside its borders, the 
panel found. 
Joel Oster of the Alliance Defense Fund, 
which represents Greece, said the town was 
prepared to appeal the case as far as the 
Supreme Court. 
"The court wants the town to be prayer 
monitors, to determine how many prayers in 
Jesus' name are too many," he said. That 
outcome violates the Establishment Clause, 
he said. Oster pointed to a 2008 ruling by 
the 11th Circuit in Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 
Georgia, upholding a county commission's 
opening prayer policy. 
But Ayesha Khan, a lawyer with Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State 
who represented the plaintiffs before the 2nd 
Circuit, said the prayer givers in Cobb 
County were more diverse than in Greece. 
"Municipalities need to ensure that no single 
religion is advanced in their prayers, and 
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they have to take a fairly active role in 
ensuring constitutional compliance," she 
said. 
In a different case in January, the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by 
Forsyth County, leaving in place a 4th 
Circuit ruling that stopped sectarian prayers 
at county board meetings. 
The 2nd Circuit case is Galloway et al v. 




“What Should the Supreme Court do With Town Board Prayers in Galloway 
v. Town of Greece?” 
Verdict 
June 7, 2013 
Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein 
 
Last week the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
review in an important case involving the 
First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause, Galloway v. Town of 
Greece.  Galloway involves a decade-plus- 
long practice in the upstate New York Town 
of Greece of starting Town Board meetings 
with a short prayer.  Before 1999, the Town 
(which has slightly fewer than 100,000 
residents) began Board meetings with a 
moment of silence.  But since then, it has 
been inviting local clergy to offer an 
opening prayer after the Pledge of 
Allegiance has been recited. Prayer-givers 
deliver their prayer over the Board’s public 
address system, and many have asked 
members of the audience to bow their heads, 
stand, or join in the prayer during its 
recitation.  The Town asserts that anyone—
followers of any religion, agnostics, and 
atheists alike—can request to offer an 
invocation, and that it has never turned 
down any request.  But in practice, Christian 
clergy have given nearly all the prayers 
since 1999, and have been invited to do so 
by the Town, which often calls them 
“chaplain[s] of the month.” 
As fellow Verdict columnist Marci 
Hamilton pointed out last week in her 
analysis of this case, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit (with 
esteemed Judge Guido Calabresi writing) 
invalidated the Town’s practice, finding that 
the prayers, in context, had to be understood 
as a public endorsement of Christianity, 
which violated the First Amendment’s ban 
on laws respecting an establishment of 
religion.  We agree with much of Judge 
Calabresi’s reasoning, but in the space 
below we offer additional reasons—ones we 
feel the Second Circuit did not adequately 
explore—to be skeptical about what the 
Town has been doing. 
The Town of Greece’s Practice Does 
Implicate Religious Equality Values 
Disputes about the recitation of prayers 
before town board or city council meetings 
implicate many values underlying the 
Establishment Clause. The Second Circuit’s 
opinion, which focused on the so-called 
endorsement test, spoke primarily in terms 
of religious equality.  And there are 
powerful equality-based grounds for 
challenging the town of Greece’s 
government-sponsored prayers. For these 
constitutional purposes, equality means not 
only equality in material benefits but also 
equality of status and respect. This has been 
clear since the Court declared in Brown v. 
Board of Education that physically 
comparable but separate public schools that 
are segregated by race violated the equal 
protection clause because of the message of 
inferior status they communicated to 
African-American children. When 
government bodies select leaders of 
majoritarian religions to lead sectarian 
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prayers to open local governmental 
proceedings, while ignoring the beliefs of 
other citizens, the message of lack of worth 
and disrespect for minority religions and the 
non-religious would be hard to avoid. 
To be sure, there is nothing intrinsically 
disrespectful about being asked to stand 
while prayers of a different faith than our 
own are being offered. Most of us have 
probably been asked to do so when 
attending a wedding, bar mitzvah or other 
religious event in the house of worship of 
neighbors and friends. In those situations, 
however, we are guests in the sanctuary of a 
different faith community.  As outsiders, we 
do not expect our different religious 
identities to be recognized. There is no 
pretense that the rituals being observed 
reflect our own religious commitments. But 
citizens of a town or city are not guests and 
outsiders at the public meetings of their 
government. They belong to the political 
community and, quite reasonably, resent 
being treated as strangers who are not being 
shown the same respect afforded to its 
favored members. 
And the Town has been essentially 
discriminating against minority religious 
voices. By focusing on majoritarian sects—
the Town drew some prayer leaders from a 
list of congregations printed in the Chamber 
of Commerce’s directory—the Town 
effectively excluded religious adherents who 
live in the Town but who lack the numbers 
to establish a physical congregation within 
the community.  Oftentimes, as in the area 
surrounding UC Davis, where we both teach 
law, religious practitioners may have an 
insufficient number of members to establish 
a congregation in their own town, and for 
that reason they worship in a congregation 
in a neighboring town.  But if each town 
used only a directory of congregations 
located within that town as the source of 
clergy to be invited to lead prayers at Board 
meetings, many religions would be left out. 
Equality Is Not the Only Establishment 
Clause Value at Stake Here, the Town 
Councils Differ from State Legislatures 
As powerful as the equality concerns in this 
case are, they should not cause us to 
overlook the important religious liberty 
concerns that are also raised in this dispute. 
Plaintiffs argued that the prayers at Board 
meetings were coercive, but the Second 
Circuit opinion, construing these arguments 
to be focused only on children, quickly 
rejected these claims in a footnote. Plaintiffs 
were adults, the court reasoned, and the 
prayers at the Town Board meeting here 
were no more coercive than the prayers 
offered at sessions of the Nebraska state 
legislature that the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld against an Establishment Clause 
challenge in Marsh v. Chambers in 1983. 
We think the court was far too quick to 
dismiss these religious liberty concerns on 
the authority of the Marsh decision. 
There are critical distinctions between city 
councils and state legislatures that produce 
very different kinds of audiences who attend 
the meetings of these different government 
bodies. Most of what a state legislature does 
involves the formulation and enactment of 
general legislation that impacts large groups 
and constituencies. There may be some 
narrow bills that address limited issues, but 
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the majority of the state legislature’s work 
relates to laws of significant breadth and 
scope. By contrast, the work of a city 
council, in most of the towns and cities of 
the United States, regularly deals with 
decisions affecting small groups and 
individuals. Land-use decisions impact 
individual neighbors and neighborhoods. 
Funding decisions may burden particular 
small constituencies. Often town councils 
and boards act as administrative tribunals in 
a quasi- adjudicatory capacity, hearing 
personnel grievances or land use appeals. 
Thus, these local government meetings are 
much more likely to be focused on particular 
individuals than are the general laws that 
state legislatures consider at their sessions. 
Moreover, and related to these differences, 
citizens who watch the deliberations of the 
state legislature from the gallery are almost 
always passive observers of the 
government’s functions. They have no role 
to play in the legislative process. Citizens 
who attend city council meetings do so for 
very different reasons. Usually they are not 
passive witnesses attending the sessions to 
be better informed about government 
operations. They attend council meetings to 
participate in government by speaking to the 
Council during public comment periods. 
They want and expect to be seen and heard 
by the Council. Their goal is to influence 
decisionmakers, not to simply observe or 
monitor them. For that reason, the ability to 
address the Council in person is an 
important right of political participation. 
Finally, outside of major metropolitan areas, 
there are stark difference between the size 
and format of state legislative chambers and 
sessions, and those of city councils. State 
legislators rarely know who is sitting in their 
legislative galleries. The size of the 
chambers and the number of legislators and 
visitors preclude any such knowledge or 
sense of familiarity.  Not so, in the small 
meeting rooms of a city council, where the 
physical proximity between the Council and 
the audience and the limited number of 
participants make it far easier for Council 
members to be aware of their audience. 
Because of these differences, the decision 
in Marsh tells us very little about the 
coercive nature of government-sponsored 
prayer at city council meetings. In the 
setting of a city council meeting, citizens 
who wish to address the council are coerced 
when they are asked to stand or otherwise 
affirm the prayer that is being offered in 
their name. A failure to comply would risk 
alienating the very political decisionmakers 
whom they hope to influence. 
The Town of Greece provides a good 
illustration.  Citizens there who feel 
excluded and burdened by the Board 
meeting’s prayers have no good alternatives. 
They can try to arrive at the council session 
after the pledge and prayer have been 
completed—but they may stand out in a 
small council meeting room for doing so. It 
would be even more awkward to stay and 
recite the pledge and affirm their loyalty to 
our country, leave for the prayer, and then 
return after the prayer is over. Or they can 
sacrifice their religious liberty by agreeing 
to have someone appointed by the 
government pray in their name. Visitors 
sitting in the gallery at the state legislature 
experience no such vulnerability or pressure. 
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Why the School Analogy Doesn’t 
Undercut Galloway’s Liberty Claims 
Some commentators and jurists point to the 
school setting and argue that it suggests that 
coercion-based arguments depend upon the 
malleability of the listener.  They read the 
school cases for the proposition that state-
sponsored prayer is unconstitutional in the 
context of public schools only because 
children, on account of their age and 
maturity, are uniquely susceptible to 
indoctrination and the pressure to 
conform.  By contrast, adults attending city 
council meetings, it is suggested, should be 
capable of withstanding such compulsions. 
This argument is unpersuasive. The major 
problem with religious coercion is not that it 
may actually change people’s religious 
beliefs and practices. It is that when 
religious individuals defy the state’s 
coercive efforts, they suffer burdens and 
penalties for doing so. Religious coercion is 
as unconstitutional when it fails as it is when 
it succeeds. 
Prayer in the public schools is distinctively 
problematic, but not just because it is 
directed at children. It is particularly 
dangerous because teachers and 
administrators have so much discretionary 
power over the students in their charge. Both 
students and their parents know that it is 
treacherous to alienate school personnel 
because retaliation is so easy to mete out and 
hard to prove. 
Citizens attending city council meetings for 
the purpose of influencing the council’s 
decision confront a similar burden that does 
not dissipate with age or maturity. The 
decisions of a city council often involve 
substantial political discretion in weighing 
the competing concerns of relatively small 
constituencies. Citizens who refuse to join in 
prayers offered by clergy invited by the 
council risk overtly or subconsciously 
retaliatory rulings. 
A Final, Particular Way in Which the 
Town of Greece’s Practice Offends 
Liberty 
The Town of Greece’s approach to public 
prayer at issue in this case involves a 
particularly egregious affront to religious 
liberty. There are at least two kinds of 
prayers that an organization may use to 
begin a session or meeting.  In one kind of 
prayer, the speaker prays in his or her own 
name for G-d’s blessing to be given for the 
meeting and its participants. There is a 
religious liberty issue implicated here, in 
that individuals may feel that they should 
not be required to be present while a prayer 
is expressed. The weight of that burden may 
be somewhat mitigated, however, by the fact 
that many people do not experience the fact 
that someone else is offering a prayer for 
their well-being as a burden on their 
liberty—even if the person who is doing the 
praying is of a different faith. 
But a far greater affront to religious liberty 
occurs when the second kind of prayer is 
undertaken.  In this kind of prayer, the 
speaker claims to be offering a collective 
prayer expressing the beliefs of the 
audience, a collectivity to which audience 
members are asked to acquiesce by standing 
or bowing their heads. The decision about 
when and how to speak to G-d, and the 
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words one chooses in that expression, 
belong to the individual. It is an 
extraordinary intrusion into the religious 
liberty of the individual for the state to usurp 
those decisions. The state cannot tell people 
that as a condition to attending and 
commenting during a city council meeting, 
they have to delegate to the state the power 
to appoint someone to pray to G-d in their 
name. 
This basic commitment to personal religious 
autonomy is the foundation of the American 
understanding of religious liberty. When 
colonial proponents of religious liberty 
argued that religious freedom was an 
inalienable right, they were speaking 
literally, not figuratively. It made no sense 
to suggest that a person could somehow 
surrender his relationship with and duty to 
G-d to a government official, or to anyone 
else for that matter. Throughout the Great 
Awakening and continuing on to the 
ratification of the Constitution, advocates of 
religious liberty insisted on the right of the 
individual to choose who would minister to 
his or her spiritual needs and lead him or her 
in worship. Established religions violated 
these principles of religious liberty—and 
thereby prompted the First Amendment—
precisely because they employed the 
coercive power of government to influence 
the private judgment of the individual in 
matters of religion. 
Coercive collective prayer at city council 
meetings undermines religious equality by 
discriminating against minority faiths. And 
it abridges religious liberty by insinuating 
the state into the individual’s relationship 
with G-d and compelling people to engage 
in prayer that lacks personal authenticity. 
The Constitution prohibits the state from 
engaging in such practices. 
 
 
